Jackson, Wyoming (Snow King) 12 March 1964

From: The Snowy Torrents

WEATHER FACTORS
Intensity of a storm beginning the night of 11 March increased on the morning of 12 March. Snowfall and precipitation intensity were low but increasing, with a warming trend in mid-morning. Maximum temperature for the period was 34 degrees: minimal temperature, 23 degrees. Visibility was poor due to cloudiness, snowfall and falling snow.

ACCIDENT SUMMARY
The avalanche accident involved R.P., a professional ski patrolman with over five years experience and an experienced mountain climber, and F.E., a ski patrolman and ski mountaineer with four years experience. R.P. was responsible for avalanche hazard evaluation in the Snow King Area. The two responsible patrolmen had patrolled, toured and worked on avalanche control together during the past five winters.

About 11:15 a.m., the patrolmen left the lower terminal on Snow King mountain and proceeded to the upper terminal where they intended to remove a small cornice – about 30 inches of overhang which had built up overnight due to wind and four inches of snowfall – on the east ridge of Snow King. This is a routine procedure in the area. The men roped up with a 45 foot, 3/8 manila rope, chosen repeatedly by them for this type of routine cornice work in preference to the more cumbersome 120 or 150 foot, 3/8 or 7/8 inch mountain climbing nylon rope. They were three-quarters of the way up the ridge and had released cornices and small, new slabs. It was decided to climb the remaining distance on foot along the windblown ridge crest, above the Upper Grizzly access cut. Regular control work is not always carried out along the upper portion of the ridge. The patrolmen could not remember whether the upper portion of the ridge had released at any time earlier in the winter.

They stopped on the drift at the head of the first avalanche gully east of Grizzly Run and decided to stamp on it to see if they could make it slide. F.E. established a static belay using his ski poles at the top of the drift and at the edge of the timber. R.P. moved out to the end of the rope. Stamping as he went, with no slide occurring. He called for more rope. Leaving his poles behind, F.E. moved out and down about 15 feet and set his skis. As R. P. stamped the slope, old wind slab under the new snow fractured simultaneously in many places, with a fracture about six feet deep. Both patrolmen were catapulted into the narrow slide gully, about 20 feet wide and directly below their position. The slide path was quite thickly forested with young fir trees, 3 to 5 inches in diameter and 15 to 25 feet high. F.E. was carried about 150 feet down the slope before catching among several small trees. The rope snapped down the slope before catching among several small trees. The rope snapped at the knot, and R.P. continued down the slide for about 1,000 feet.

Though shaken up, F.E. was unhurt in the accident. He extricated himself from the trees and immediately began the search for his partner. Upon reaching the terminus of the slide, he spotted a boot sticking out of the snow, just below a small tree. The victim was caught around the tree, his back uphill, barely covered with snow. F.E. immediately administered mouth to mouth respiration. No more than 12 to 15 minutes had elapsed from the release of the slide to the discovery of the injured patrolman. After approximately an hour and a half, F.E. concluded that he could not help his friend. He left the body at 2:05 p.m. and reached a patrol phone at 2:20p.m.

RESCUE
At 2:00 p.m. Forester E.H. received the report of a possible avalanche accident on the ski hill. He was informed that patrolmen R.P. and F.E. had not been heard from in over two hours. He was asked to take charge of rescue operations. At this time, the call was received from F.E. and a party of seven was dispatched to the exact location. Two medical doctors were included in this party. Several other volunteers arrived to join the search party. To avoid additional slide hazard and to account for all personnel, no other parties were sent to the scene. By 3:30 p.m. the body of R.P. was removed from the area, and all personnel were off the hill.

The victim suffered a fractured leg. Death was due to suffocation.

AVALANCHE DATA
The slide occurred on a 45 degree slope. The entire hill on which the slide had occurred was closed during the search and removal of the victim, and after his removal. Further control work was continued the following day, 13 March, to insure safety of the area.

COMMENTS
It has repeatedly been emphasized in training programs and publications that avalanche release and cornice breaking by cutting and stamping with skis should be done only on slopes where accidents will not have serious or fatal consequences. This type of avalanche control by ski release should be employed only on small slopes. Slide paths of the magnitude involved in this accident should be controlled only by explosives.

An improperly located and unsafe belay position was also, in part, responsible for this accident. The belayer was below the fracture line when the cornice broke off. The secondary cause was an inadequate rope. The weathered 3/8 inch manila rope was too short, necessitating the improper placement of the belayer, and was not strong enough to hold when the slide occurred. A regular nylon climbing rope with a very safe belay is required for cornice control work. The forces generated by sliding snow are every bit as large as those encountered in the most severe mountaineering fall.

This accident illustrates the lesson that nothing can be left to chance, and no deviation from known safe practice can be considered as acceptable in avalanche control work. The hazards are great even when all rules are strictly followed.